intended to convey the notion that complexity cannot be completely controlled, but only influenced by design. To a considerable extent, complexity arises from the self-organisation of agents that act according to what makes sense to them from a local perspective (Cilliers, 1998) . In construction, four exemplar guidelines for coping with complexity have been proposed by Bertelsen and Koskela (2005) . These include creating slack, reducing complexity through modularisation and standardisation, codification through the implementation of the Last Planner System of production control, and improving improvisation skills. In healthcare, Braithwaite et al. (2018) compiled 20 complexity-oriented enablers and insights. More generally, Clegg (2000) proposes core principles of socio-technical systems design, which have an underlying complexity thinking.
In this Editorial, five guidelines for coping with complexity devised by are adopted as a basis (Table I) . A sixth guideline, referred to as Guidelines Dimensions of the guidelines Provide slack Slack is a mechanism for reducing interdependencies and slowing down or eliminating the propagation of variability (Safayeni and Purdy, 1991) . Slack is usually operationalised through some human (e.g. cross-trained professionals), technical (e.g. spare pieces of equipment) or organisational resource (e.g. double-check of quality specifications). Slack can be either designed into the system or arise opportunistically as a result of self-organisation (Saurin and Werle, 2017 ) Give visibility to processes and outcomes Systems should be intuitive (Clegg, 2000) , to reduce imaginary complexity Visibility should be given to informal work practices, which may encompass either useful innovations or latent hazards that overtime may be taken for granted as part of regular work Visibility should allow for real-time performance monitoring and the free sharing of information (Galsworth, 2017 ) Encourage diversity of perspectives when making decisions Diversity of perspectives may help to tackle uncertainty Agents involved in decision-making should hold complementary skills Some requirements for the implementation of this guideline are high levels of trust, reduction of power differentials and identification of apt decision-makers (Page, 2010) Monitor and understand the gap between work-as-done (WAD) and work-as-imagined (WAI) Standardised operating procedures cannot cover all situations. Complexity theory regards procedures as dynamic, local and situated constructions, which need adaptation in the face of variability. This is in contrast with the traditional view of procedures as "devised by experts (management) to guard against the errors and mistakes of fallible human operators at the sharp end, who are more limited than the experts in their competence" (Hale and Borys, 2013) . Procedures may be of different types (e.g. goal oriented, action oriented) and, for all types, the gap between them and practice should be monitored Monitor unintended consequences of improvements and small changes The impacts of small changes and improvements may be significant in complex systems due to non-linear interactions (Perrow, 1984) . Improvements and small changes interact between themselves, and this poses opportunities for unintended consequences. Small changes and improvements may be either non-intentional or intentionally self-initiated by the organisation (e.g. through kaizen) as well as originated from external sources (e.g. a client changes its order) Source: Adapted from "create conditions that support resilience", is not explicitly discussed given that it is interpreted mostly as a consequence of following the other guidelines. These guidelines have been identified from a literature review that covered a wide variety of sources (e.g. theoretical discussions and reports of practical experiences of applying complexity thinking). Besides, their small number makes it practical their use for this Editorial. Piece of evidence of the construct validity of these guidelines in construction is available from Saurin, Rooke, Koskela and Kemmer (2013) , who presented a description of what these guidelines look like in a refurbishment project. In healthcare, Bueno et al. (2019) discussed how improvement interventions in intensive care units accounted for these same guidelines.
It is worth noting that contingency is a core characteristic of socio-technical system design (Clegg, 2000) and, as such, the mentioned guidelines are context dependent, and their use can trigger undesired interactions. For example, privacy may sometimes take priority over visual control (Bernstein, 2012) , and slack may introduce more parts and interactions into the system, thus creating new error possibilities (Perrow, 1984) .
Overview of the papers included in this Special Issue
An overview of the 11 papers that form this Special Issue is presented in this section. Sherratt and Ivory unpack the shared understanding of safety held by workers on five large construction sites in the UK using a complexity lens. Results provide empirical support for the inclusion of situational self-organising as part of construction safety management systems.
Both the papers by Regis et al. and Aboagye-Nimo et al. address the role played by women in the construction industry. Regis et al. identify the main difficulties faced by female front-line workers at Brazilian construction sites, as well as good practices that might provide a better environment for them. In turn, Aboagye-Nimo et al. take a complementary perspective, focussing on difficulties faced by women in managerial roles in six large construction companies in the UK. Both studies point out several problems, such as prejudice in the hiring process, division of labour based on gender instead of competence and a struggle to re-enter the industry after maternity leave.
Hampton et al. investigate how stress develops and manifests in three UK construction projects, highlighting contributing factors to stress, consequences and tools to cope with stress based on an ethnographic study. Also, in the UK, Oswald et al. discuss the informal management activities and financial incentives that occur when projects are under production pressure. Both studies point out that coping with uncertainty about limited time is an essential source of stress and pressure to construction workers. Safety tends to be hindered by these pressures, according to Oswald et al.
MD and Gangadhar introduce a knowledge-based safety culture measurement tool and examine its validity and reliability in the Indian context. The tool is comprised of a questionnaire based on 69 factors that influence knowledge-based safety culture. Results of applying the questionnaire indicate the importance of accounting for the knowledge dimension when developing a safety culture in the construction industry.
Manu et al. develop a tool for assessing the Design for Occupational, Safety and Health (DfOSH) organisational capability of construction firms. The tool is organised around 18 capability attributes nested within 6 categories, namely, competence, strategy, corporate experience, systems, infrastructure and collaboration. The attributes related to competence are highlighted as the most important.
Jin et al. use the Prevention through Design (PtD) concept and 4D BIM as a basis to develop a tool for assessing construction risksat the activity level and dailyduring early phases of multistore building projects. A case study in the USA illustrates the application of the tool.
Nnaji et al. identify 26 factors that predict successful adoption of safety technologies in construction, in the context of the USA. Statistical analysis indicates that 12 out of the 2511 Guest editorial 26 predictors are the most influentialtechnology reliability, effectiveness and durability were ranked as the most influential predictors.
Mzyece et al. explore the interoperability between the Construction Design Management (CDM) regulations and BIM, based on a systematic literature review and theoretical testing. Results indicate that BIM provides a systematic approach for the discharge of CDM obligations.
Finally, Melo and Costa propose a framework to integrate resilience engineering concepts and unmanned aerial systems technology in order to support the safety planning and control process. A case study of applying the framework, in Brazil, demonstrates the benefits and barriers associated with the proposal.
Overall, these studies offer a mix of perspectives addressing: the description of what complexity looks like, such as the investigations of production pressures, stress and women's role; tools for measuring proxies of complexity, such as the safety culture survey and the list of attributes for assessing design for safety organisational capability; and tools for influencing complexity, such as the use of BIM and unmanned aerial systems for risk assessment and monitoring. These three perspectives have a parallel with the three emphases of resilience engineering studies identified by Nemeth and Herrera (2015) , namely, finding resilience, assessing resilience and influencing resilience through design.
How the adoption of the guidelines was analysed
A content analysis of the papers above (Bryman, 2016) was carried out in order to assess whether and how the previously mentioned guidelines were accounted for by the papers that form this Special Issue. As such, we looked for excerpts of text that could point out examples of either adopting or neglecting the guidelines. An excerpt could consist of several lines of text, and be associated with more than one guideline. Data interpretation encompassed possible applications of the guidelines, even if these have not been explicitly discussed in the papers. Table II presents the results of the analysis, illustrating how the papers accounted or could have accounted, for the five guidelines for coping with complexity. Examples of applying all guidelines were identified. This suggests that the complexity of construction projects can be intuitively acknowledged both in the research design and in the development of strategies for coping with complexity in practice.
How the guidelines were accounted for
Regarding the guideline "provide slack", Ziyu et al. describe an excellent example of applying a slack strategy known as the margin of manoeuvre. According to Stephens et al. (2011) , this strategy means the creation of margin (i.e. slack in terms of time in this case) via local reorganisation or expansion of a unit's ability to regulate its margini.e. through early risk assessment based on 4D BIM. By contrast, insufficient slack (e.g. overtime work) seemed to be an underlying contributing factor to unsafe practices, workers' fatigue and stress, as pointed out by Hampton et al. and Oswald et al.
The use of information technology also supported innovative applications of the guideline "give visibility to processes and outcomes". Melo and Costa illustrate how this could occur through the use of unmanned aerial systems for safety inspections, while Ziyu et al. show how the benefits of 4D BIM visualisation for risk assessment.
The guideline "encourage diversity of perspectives when making decisions" was adopted in the research design of some studiese.g. interviews with several stakeholders. Hampton et al. demonstrate how the neglect of the said guideline may be underlying the stress of construction workers and managers. Similarly, the use of the guideline "monitor and understand the gap between work-as-imagined and work-as-done" was intrinsic to some research designs that privileged qualitative data and understanding of the tacit and hidden social relationships in construction sites. This is illustrated by Sherratt and Ivory, who The study did not address this guideline.
(continued ) There was a concern with unintended consequences from the UAS -e.g. interference in the construction tasks during the flight; and b) the invasion of privacy Table II. 2516 ECAM 26,11 uncovered workers self-organising strategies that contributed to maintaining safety in the face of complexity. The study by Oswald et al. also shed light on work-as-done by using an ethnographic approach for investigating production pressures. Finally, the adoption of the guideline "monitor unintended consequences of improvements and small changes" was implicit in some papers when they discussed barriers to implement the proposed solutions and the drawbacks of refusing to cope with complexity. This point is exemplified by the two papers that addressed the role played by women in the construction industry (Regis et al., Emmanuel et al.) . Discriminatory practices and the sector's lack of attractiveness to women ultimately hinder the industry's performance, in terms of skill shortage and lack of cognitive diversity.
Conclusions
This Special Issue documents empirical and theoretical work that contribute to the understanding of construction safety, health and well-being from a complexity lens. The papers cover a wide range of social and technical topics, which need to be investigated from a holistic and integrated perspective. The contents are expected to encourage innovative thinking and action for coping with complexity in construction. In particular, there seems to be an opportunity for the investigation of how the five discussed guidelines for coping with complexityalong with other insights from CT and systems safety approachescan give rise to new principles and practices to support resilience in construction projects. 
